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

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The United States Food Aid Program
Ghana Case Study

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THE UNITED STATES FOOD AID PROGRAM

GHANA CASE STUDY

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A. Introduction

To understand the impact of U.S. food assistance in Ghana, one must have a relatively good sense of Ghana's economic and socio-cultural situations. It is a country in which the population, has been growing faster than increases in agricultural productivity and its a country where economic resources and access to services are not only not equally available to all Ghanaians, but where, in a number of situations, the disparatity between the relatively well-off and the poorest 40 percent of the population may be widening. It is a country where, measured by macroeconomic or national income indicators, there has been commendable growth since the economic nadir of 1983; but it also a country where the rural poor in its northern half are as poor as any in Africa and where there is disquieting evidence that the urban poor, even in the largest cities of the south are getting poorer.

Three decades of U.S. food aid has been provided to Ghana for a wide variety of purposes: support for policy reform, assistance to the public budget, feeding of destitute people, improved nutrition of mothers, infants and small children, and for a wide variety of project-level, specific economic development objectives. While there have been a large number of evaluations, most have evaluated management effectiveness, the actual vs. planned achievement of output level objectives or the relatively near-term (within a year or two of the provision of the food) impact on its target beneficiaries of a particular program. This evaluation is intended to stand back and look at the totality of assistance since the early 1960s and to attempt to understand what actually was accomplished.

Such an endeavor is difficult. The evidence of accomplishment is in many cases more than 20 years old. Most of the records have long been retired or destroyed. The active planners and implementers are, for the most part, no longer available and, even in cases when they have been located, their memories of accomplishment are only partial and are shaded by overlays of more recent programs and activities. The public record from the earlier years is often a record of stated intentions, or of problems encountered and resolved, or of short-term accomplishments at the output level (e.g., providing encouragement to the Government of Ghana to launch its comprehensive Economic Recovery Program, the feeding of 'x' thousand people in the aftermath of a traumatic, exogenous shock, or the provision of 'y' metric tons of fortified foods in support of maternal and child health programs in 'z' clinics and health posts for several years). There is very little that was done at the time to establish indicators of 'before,' in order to enable subsequent monitoring of changes in the indicators during the implementation period which were associated with food aid inputs. It is even more difficult in the absence of baseline and monitoring data to measure the "after effects" at a point in time well beyond the terminal date of a particular food-aided program. Thus, while it must certainly be true that the regular provision of fortified foods such as

wheat-soy blend or of soy-fortified sorghum grits to significantly underweight children or mothers, helped those children or mothers to regain weight or health and, in the case of infants, to grow more normally during the period the food was provided, what can realistically be said about the overall utility of what are inevitable three-month to two-year supplemental feeding of a small sub-set of Ghana's population when there are so many more equally malnourished children (or pregnant/lactating mothers) who are not only not touched by these particular programs but who have no increased chance of being served by this type of transfer as a result of the food aid. In other words, is the possibly temporary improvement in mother and child health of those few hundred thousands beneficiaries sufficient success in the face of millions not so benefited? Is it sufficient to provide supplementary feeding when the factors that caused the malnourishment in the first place are not only not being adequately addressed, but, in many cases, are not even being identified and quantified?

Similarly for program food aid: is it sufficient justification to claim a success in using food aid to support a particular government policy change when: I) it is neither proven nor provable that the availability of the food aid actually improved the chances of the adoption of the policy, ii) the actual implementation of the policy (as opposed to its promulgation) may not have occurred at the rate or to the extent anticipated (and may not have been monitored) and iii) where the policy itself may or may not have had the desired beneficial effect, even where appropriately implemented? We must also wonder whether, say, half as much food aid might have generated the same support on the part of Ghanaian authorities? or would twice as much food aid have generated more than twice as much policy reform? Where among all the tens of millions of dollars spent on food aid to Ghana would smaller transfers have generated as much impact, or twice as much generated more than double the impact? These would be important answers to generate in the context of wanting to determine some underlying sense of the true development effectiveness of food aid, but there, in fact, is no way to do it. There were no experiments attempted to determine the sensitivity of policy outputs or progress toward policy objectives to dollar or tonnage measures of food assistance. Thus, we do not know the answers to these questions; we will never know. But what this means is that we as evaluators either have to accept the judgment of those we have interviewed who were involved with these programs at the time and their often intuitive beliefs that the food aid was a critical element leading to the adoption of desired policies, that the policies did have the intended positive effect and that these positive effects were sufficient in size and magnitude to have created reasonably equitably distributed economic change leading to improved lives and livelihoods (with whatever reasonable lags have been imposed by the reality of Ghana) on the part of a significant number of Ghana's citizenry, or chose to conclude that these assertions are not proved. If we as evaluators want to dispute such claims, we will be as hampered by the lack of quantifiable evidence to support any such contentions as are those who believe food aid to have been effective in the policy realm. There is simply no good evidence one way or

the other to support or reject the hypothesis that food aid played an important role in the Ghanaian Government's chain of decisions over the years since the mid 1980s to 'stay the course' under difficult circumstances on what is often described as Africa's most outstanding structural adjustment success.

On the other hand, what this evaluation has searched for is evidence that food aid (either alone or in combination with other assistance resources) has been directed at removing or attenuating the causes that gave rise to its need in the first place; or that overall economic assistance will generate improvements in food availability or individual entitlement to food which will reduce the call on future foreign food assistance. In other words, if there are large and/or increasing numbers of malnourished mothers and infants requiring supplemental feeding in northern Ghana or in the urban slums, has food aid or food aid in combination with other resources (from USAID or other donors) been used in ways which will combat the causative factors and ultimately reduce the need for food aid? Alternatively, has food aid been used to increase local capacities to seek out and address these causes? Or has food aid been used to increase local capacities to respond to the need for food transfers thus eventually replacing the reliance on foreign food aid sources such as the U.S.? If not, then why not? Not to have done so almost certainly means there will be no future reduction in the need for external sources of food assistance. There is little evidence that the U.S. or any food donors will be able to provide (what one can only surmise would be) growing levels of food aid to provide for a growing and no less food insecure Ghanaian population in the 21st century.

B. The Context of Food Aid for the Social Sectors

Ghana has, since the mid1980s, been attempting to recover from a severe decline in living standards which occurred in the preceding two decades. GNP fell sharply before 1983. This was caused in part by severe drought in the early 1980s and the expulsion from Nigeria of over two million Ghanaians between 1982 and 1984. It was also caused by a policy environment inimical to economic growth. By the early 1980s the economy was in a shambles and a decision was made by the Ghanaian government in consultation with the major international lending organizations to undertake a long-term repair and restructuring endeavor intended to revive the economy over the long term.

Beginning in 1983 and continuing (with a few modest lapses) to the present, Ghana's Economic Recovery Program (ERP) has engendered an estimated growth rate of about 5 percent. The ERP was designed to increase production in Ghana by bringing about economic and financial stability. It set out to reduce government spending and the size of the government's workforce. It eliminated a number of government parastatals and marketing boards, sought to reduce and then eliminate government controls over the

private sector and to weaken the adverse factors which had been contributing to high rates of inflation and negative rates of real interest. Price supports were consequently eliminated, the prices of agricultural inputs--particularly fertilizers--were allowed to rise to market-determined levels and as a result large numbers of very poor farm households found themselves unable to purchase production enhancing technology. While praised as one of the most successful economic restructuring programs ever undertaken in Sub-Saharan Africa, success as measured at the macroeconomic level has had its costs, at least temporarily, among the poorer sections of the population who were adversely impacted by some of the ERP reforms. Prices on all products--particularly basic foods--escalated dramatically while many of the sources of income did not keep up and real wages declined, formal sector unemployment increased and, in general the lot of the poor seems to have worsened, at least temporarily, during the first years of the ERP.

At the same time, the average size of household farm plots continued to decrease as the population grew. The practice of rotating agriculture, characterized by long fallow periods for fertility regeneration, was being practiced with declining frequency and the fertility of the soils deteriorated with constant usage and declining application of fertilizers. A series of droughts, insect infestations and damaging bush fires during the 1980s also served to reduce food productivity and production. During the period 1970-86 most indicators of agricultural and food produced by Ghanaians (see, for example, the time series data on Ghanaian food production stored on-line by USDA at the Mann Library at Cornell University) show substantially downward trends--both in absolute and per capita terms. The ability of the common subsistence farm household to provision itself with food--either through self-provision (same year production plus drawdowns of stored foods plus gathering), purchase, barter or transfer appears according to fragmentary FAO, UNICEF and World Bank data, appears to have been declining--especially in the one-rainy-season-per-year northern part of the country. Food availability has apparently not been keeping pace with the 2.8-3.1 percent population growth rate over the past 30 years and as a result commonly used indicators of food and nutrition status such as percent of imputed expenditures devoted to the purchase of food, estimated of crop productivity per rural household, nutritional anthropometry and child and maternal health indicators all show little positive change over the longer period. (See the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) Data series, for example. To be fair, it should be noted that the Ghanaian Government's "The Pattern of Poverty of Poverty in Ghana: 1988-1992" suggests evidence of improvement in several indicators of rural poverty, although it cautions the reader to be careful about making time comparisons on many of the poverty indicators because of changes in the design of the questionnaires. The study also seems to show increasing rather than decreasing poverty in the urban areas.)

Even with the sustained GNP growth rates which have been achieved over the past 10-12 years, the World Bank's Harold Alderman has estimated that it would be well into the next century before the average Ghanaian achieved a quality of life similar to that enjoyed by the average Ghanaian citizen in 1965. The WFP Five-Year Country Strategy Outline (October, 1996) states that, even if present rates of growth are sustained, the poorest of the poor in Ghana would not rise above the poverty line for another 50 years.

While there are, as of the mid 1990s, widely differing viewpoints on the successes of the ERP, there is greater consensus around the proposition that the Ghanaian poor have been the last to have been positively affected. Their livelihood security has not yet been made more visibly robust by the advent of the ERP or by any other government programs in recent years. By and large, both rural and urban poor seem at little or no reduced risk of falling below--or remaining below--the poverty line. Their ability to secure adequate and appropriate foodstuffs throughout all the weeks of the year and year-after-year have not been distinctly improved by the macroeconomic successes of the past 10-12 years and may, in fact, have worsened marginally, particularly, strangely, among the poorest of the urban dwellers. The 1992 Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) found that an estimated 72 percent of the poor (defined as those with an estimated per capita annual income of less than $163 in 1988 dollar equivalent) reside in the rural areas, six percent in Accra and the remainder in the other urban areas.

The Ghanaian Government has indicated with several policy pronouncements (e.g., the "Plan of Action on Food and Nutrition" of 1995) its intentions to achieve higher levels of food and nutrition security, better health, better income earning opportunities and improved well-being for all Ghanaians. But there remains a wide gap between the announced desire to make progress toward these goals and actual implementation. As a recent UNICEF study (UNICEF: "Situation of Women and Children in Ghana" 1995) has stated:

"Implementing cost effective policies that promote increased smallholder productivity are critical if Ghana's food sector is to continue meeting the consumption needs of a growing population. Presently, there is no well-defined policy framework for achieving household food security and better nutrition in Ghana. Improving household food security and nutrition must be addressed by a wide spectrum of policies and programs that affect all factors influencing the supply of and the demand for food, as well as the provision of basic necessities and services, such as water, education and health that are crucial inputs into nutritional status."

Various recent poverty studies in Ghana, most notably the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) together with its follow-up studies and the World Bank's "Ghana: Poverty Past, Present and Future," have begun to assist in the general understanding of the situation of the poor--where they are, how many there are and what are the

determinants of their poverty. The poorest areas of the country are the administrative regions of Upper West, Upper East and Northern, with Volta Region being almost as poor. One-third of all Ghanaians exist below the poverty line of $163 per year and half of these exist below the absolute poverty line of $82 per year--a level of nearly life-threatening deprivation.

While it is difficult, given the paucity of carefully collected data and the differences in collection, measurement and analytical methods, to compare data sets of poverty indicators over the four decades of Ghanaian independence, some rough comparisons are possible in certain areas which provide some sense of the magnitude--and direction--of change in economic and quality-of-life indicators.

1. Agricultural Production

Agriculture is the mainstay of the Ghanaian economy and the employer of an estimated 80 percent of Ghana's population. Most Ghanaian household earn their principal livelihood from cultivation of small (less than two hectares) plots, sometimes abetted by small livestock and some non-farming income earning. Growth in food production in recent decades has resulted largely from increases in area planted rather than from yield or other productivity increases. During the 1980s, the estimated rate of annual agricultural production increase (roughly estimated at 2.6-2.7 percent) fell below the estimated population growth rate of 3.1 percent. Since 1990, some observers have determined that agricultural production growth has fallen marginally, to 2.5 percent per year. At present, Ghana produces about 70 percent of its domestic cereals requirements, 25 percent of its estimated meat demand and less than 20 percent of its needs for agriculturally- based raw materials. [WFP, 1996] The World Bank estimates that Ghana's 1987 domestic cereals deficit of 128,000 MT will, by 2000, have increased to 780,00 MT0--nearly one-fifth of projected demand. Average national maize production in the period 1963-1967 was 525,000 metric tons (MT). In the period 1990-1994 average production was 823,000 MT, an increase of only about 57 percent during a period when the population grew about 140-150 percent. Average per capita maize production thus fell by more than half, as did per capita maize availability. (Note: earlier data are from Orraca-Tetteh, R., "The Need for A Nutrition Policy in National Development" Universitas 1(3) University of Ghana, Legon, March, 1972 pp. 47-67. Later data are from MOFA's "Agriculture in Ghana: Facts and Figures, Accra, November, 1995.)

2. Food and Nutritional Security

U.S. food aid legislation has required since 1990 that USAID-managed food assistance be provided to the more food insecure developing countries and that it be directed at improving the food security status of the more food insecure population groups in

those countries. In order to discuss the food security consequences of U.S. food aid to Ghana, a brief sense of the food security situation is provided.

Ghana has a serious food security problem, a consequence--or resultant condition--of many factors of which the above discussed agricultural and food production problems are only a part. Not only has Ghana failed to produce enough food to provision its population with nutritionally adequate foodstuffs throughout the year, the ability of households--both rural and urban--to gain access to needed food has also faltered.

Food availability is constrained by the problems of production described above and by extremely high post-harvest losses, a deteriorated transportation network, a severe lack of credit in the rural areas, the frequent occurrences of natural disasters and widespread water shortages exacerbated by a sadly underdeveloped irrigated agricultural sub-sector.

Access to food by households is a function of inefficient markets and resultant higher food prices plus the pervasive poverty and resultant lack of household purchasing power which characterizes Ghana no less than virtually all African countries. In effect, there are many Ghanaian households unable to secure adequate entitlement over food resources directly or over non-food assets exchangeable for food assets indirectly. As a result, estimated average caloric consumption (ranging from 2,150 and 2,950 kcal/day in Ghana) is about 75-80 percent of what is deemed adequate and for many households it is significantly below even this level, particularly in the 'lean season' which occurs some weeks or even months before the coming to market of the next harvest. UNICEF's "Ghana Program 2000" states that: " One study found that upwards of 66 percent of low income urban households failed to meet 85 percent of their basic energy requirements. This figure is greater than the 32-37 percent of families which was found in different rural areas of the country." Malnutrition is highest in the north and least pervasive in Accra and the other large cities. Stunting--height for age two standard deviations below the mean of the reference population occurs in about one-third of all Ghanaian children (vs. two percent among children in the reference population). This is about the same proportion as was measured in the 1970s. The 1993/94 Demographic and Health Survey found that wasting, normally a signal of severe food deprivation in a child in the weeks just prior to the measurement and often associated with severe drought, is found among nearly 10 percent of Ghanaian children. This is considerably higher than the norm, even for Sub-Saharan African countries. Among women--particularly pregnant and lactating women--malnutrition derived from inadequate energy intake, protein deficiencies and serious deficiencies in virtually all of the more important micro nutrients is a serious problem, resulting among other things in a high prevalence of low birth weight babies and higher rates of maternal and infant death than should occur in a country like Ghana. In Upper West Region, for example, 452 women die in child birth

for every 100,000 births, according to UNICEF data. This is an astonishingly high figure, even for tropical Africa.

The prevalence of micronutrient deficiencies is extremely high in all segments of the population, particularly in infants and young children and pregnant and lactating women. Vitamin A deficiency at both clinical and sub-clinical levels is high; iron deficiency is a major problem, as is iodine deficiency. Even at subclinical levels the impact of these deficiencies on health resiliency, resistance to infection and opportunistic disease, impaired development of brain and glands and the auto-immune system of children is well documented as are the life-long deficiencies in physical and cognitive growth caused or augmented by micronutrient deficiencies. Finally, the high starch, low protein diets common in many parts of the country at least seasonally (and throughout the year in parts of the plantain/yam/cassava consuming areas of the south and middle zones of the country) lead to particularly high prevalence of growth deficiencies in children and a high incidence of kwashiorkor. In large part a result of these nutritional deficiencies, under-five mortality in Northern Ghana is substantially higher than in the rest of the country:

Ghana: Under-Five Mortality

REGION	MORTALITY (Deaths per 1000 children)
Upper West	199
Upper East	176
Northern	217
Brong Ahafo	139
Ashanti	119
Western	107
Eastern	97
Central	140
Greater Accra	82
Volta	98

(Source: UNICEF, "Situation of Women and Children in Ghana", Accra, 1995)

C. The Social Impact of Food Aid

Food aid in many forms has been provided to Ghana since 1959: Title I and Title III program food aid; Title II humanitarian and project food aid; Section 416 surplus disposal (provided for only one year and not discussed here) and Section 104(e) local currency loans ("Cooley Loans"--which were also provided for only one year and not discussed here).

1. Title I/III (pre-1991 Title III)

For the most part program food aid--Title I and Title III have been provided intermittently in an on-off-on again fashion which has been associated with support for particular administrations in Ghana, particular political and/or economic reform efforts or policy changes. By and large, these sources of program food aid have not been intended to impact directly on the social sectors of health, nutrition, education or through direct transfers to the poorest, although in some cases indirect beneficial support by means of general budgetary support was listed among the benefits anticipated. In some cases, particularly after 1983, these USAID justification for submitting a request for Title I/III resources have contained language indicating an interest in offsetting the adverse consequences of economic reform/structural adjustment. Determining the actual impact--if any--of the food resources or the local currency counterpart is problematic.

The Ghanaian Government's need was, for the most part, in the form of general budget support, often required to cover recurrent costs of programs where the capital costs had been financed by USAID and/or other donors. Even though the conditionality ('self help measures') associated with Title I and III food aid nearly always proposed specific elements of the budget which were to be supported, the basic fungibility of the budget makes it difficult to determine whether the availability of the food aid counterpart resources actually represented additional net resources to the specified budget line items targeted for use.

Thus, it is relatively difficult--because of: i) the decidedly episodic nature of the Title I/III programs, ii) their short time durations (1-3 years), and iii) the budget attribution nature of the exercise--to find significant impact on the social sectors occurring as a result of U.S. program food aid. The principal exception to this general conclusion is the Title III program of 1992-94 (with expenditures still being made in 1996) which is discussed in its own section below, in the context of the NGO and feeder road programs. In addition there are some Ghanaian Government programs, such as the Guinea Worm Eradication and child inoculation campaigns where Title I counterpart was contributed which have had significant impact. In the case of Guinea worm eradication, the assistance was provided in conjunction with assistance from Global 2000 and was instrumental in reducing the rate of Guinea worm infection down 10-fold--nearly to the point of complete eradication. In this case, and in a few others, the local currency made available from PL 480 Title I had a major impact. In other cases, the counterpart has had specific though limited and more transitory impacts.

2. Title II

Title II food aid is another matter entirely. Quite unlike program food aid, the Title II program--primarily operating through Catholic Relief Service (CRS), Seventh Day Adventist World Service (SAWS) and its follow-on organization (Adventist Development and Relief Association (ADRA) has been made available to Ghana without interruption for 37 years. Not only have Title II resource been made available to these NGOs without interruption, the types of programs which have been funded have also remained remarkably consistent: maternal and child health supplementary feeding, pre-school feeding, school feeding, institutional feeding of extremely malnourished infants and young children ('Other Child Feeding') primary health care and food-for-work. In recent years there has been increasing use of Title II resources and the local currency generated from increased 'monetization' to undertake small-scale development activities, but, by and large, the feeding programs have predominated in the domain of the social sectors in Ghana and it is to these activities that this report now turns its focus.

a. The Catholic Relief Services Program in Ghana and its impact.

CRS involvement with Title II food aid dates from 1959. The CRS program in it earliest days seems to have been primarily a targeted feeding program focused on needy families in the aftermath of various relief feeding programs. During the early 1960s the focus gradually shifted to the MCH and school and targeted child feeding programs which have been the mainstay of CRS activities in Ghana for more than 30 years.

From its inception on to the present day the MCH program has made fortified foods, vegetable oil and cereals available in different combinations at specified rural and urban clinics or health stations for mothers of undernourished children for use normally by the child but also, in many cases by mothers who themselves are malnourished. The food is provided to mothers who bring their children to the MCH location to be weighed monthly. The mother must participate in a session about child health and nutrition, often she must present the infant for inoculation and be provided with a number of MCH-type messages and training before being allowed to collect a monthly supplementary feeding ration for her underweight child or children and/or herself. The genesis of the program is in the proven high prevalence of malnourishment among pregnant women and young mothers and their infant children in Ghana.

Throughout the 30 year history of the CRS MCH program, the number of beneficiaries has ranged between 150,000 and 275,000 per year--approximately 60 percent of whom were children and 40 percent women. Given the demographic age pyramid in Ghana in which approximately half of the population of (presently) 18 million are under 14 years of age and the estimated number of children under two years of age would have been

anywhere from one to two million over the course of the program, one might estimate that CRS MCH activities were reaching about 1 of 20 children. Given that serious stunting has been recorded in about one-third of all Ghanaian children over the years, this would imply that CRS was probably reaching about 12-15 percent of all chronically malnourished children in the country in any given year. However, given that the primary geographic area served has been in the more malnourished northern half of Ghana and given that some of the children reached in the MCH clinics may have evinced wasting rather than stunting, it is probably safer to conclude that CRS was reaching perhaps 8-10 percent of its intended target group among children with the MCH program in any one year. Further, since the number of estimated beneficiaries remained within the 150-275,000 range throughout the life of the MCH program, normal population growth would have meant that, on average over the full time period, CRS was reaching a smaller and smaller percentage of that target group. The same sense of program reach would also probably apply to the category of pregnant and lactating women who were being assisted by the MCH program. Over the years, occasion attempts were made to replace the corn-soy-milk, vegetable oil, dried milk powder, soy-fortified sorghum grits, and other commodities provided under Title II with locally produced cereals, flour and local vegetable oil, for a variety of reasons--mostly financial--these attempts failed and Title II continued to supply the commodity.

The next longest-lived CRS Title II assisted programs have been the school and preschool feeding programs and the 'other child feeding' program. (This latter is food provided to infants and children who are so nutritionally deprived that their lives are at risk.) The first has offered a school meal (either breakfast, mid-morning snack or lunch) in selected primary schools in selected malnourished areas of the country, again primarily, though not entirely, in the northern half of the country. The purpose of the program was to provide a nutritional supplement of about 500-750 kcal per school day to the students as a way of combating widespread malnutrition, to improve academic performance, to spur attendance, and to take some of the burden off very poor families for feeding their young children. Over the period approximately 30-50,000 children received benefits in any given year from the SF program and 5-10,000 from the pre-school feeding program.

Unlike the MCH program which has maintained widespread, even enthusiastic, support throughout the period, the various school-related feeding programs were often criticized. At about 4 or 5 year intervals throughout the entire 30 year period these activities have been operating, either CRS or the USAID Mission had determined that the effort needed to be made part of the regular Ghanaian education and or health system or discontinued as not being sufficiently developmental, too costly or both. In all cases the program termination was initiated or a 'phase-down' was agreed to--only to be halted and revived as droughts, economic deterioration, and eventually the ERP

program itself put additional pressures on the nutritional status of these children of poor households and the decision made that to eliminate the school feeding efforts could not be suspended without undue added nutritional risk to already very vulnerable young children.

In the school feeding as in the MCH program, there existed throughout the period, a substantial problem of programmatic exclusion. This meant that while the geographic focus on the poorer areas of Ghana implied that most of women and children touched by the program were in the right target group (the poorest, most malnourished quartile or quintile of the population), only a small percentage of the larger, equally deserving target population was being served. For every woman and child who were being reached, 10 to perhaps 20 or more were not being reached. To continue this de facto triage year after year was, however necessary, unfair and exclusionary.

More importantly, over the life of these programs, the factors in the economic, political, social and environmental domains which were conspiring to create the conditions causing the food and nutrition insecurity in the first place--the poverty and the lack of adequate public or private capacities to deal with these problems--were not being adequately addressed; in many cases were not being addressed at all. Many of these causative factors were, in fact, unidentified. This meant that, unless other development programs--whether components of the ERP or derived from the years of project assistance by all donors--could have alleviated these causes, any decision made to reduce or terminate one or another of these social support MCH or feeding programs, the situation would have reverted to what it had been before the programs started.

In effect, little or no significant progress has been made to eliminate the causes of the problems or the need for these programs to alleviate the adversity caused by them. Thus the situation is that CRS (and other entities doing similar work in Ghana) seemingly have to remain frozen in these assistance programs indefinitely because little of significance has been created to alleviate or even attenuate the underlying causes and the malnutrition and other adverse effect resulting from them.

Thus, while the CRS efforts have had undeniable, beneficial impact on the many hundreds of thousands of individual mothers and small children who have been targeted by the supplementary feeding efforts since 1959, there has been little impact on the causes creating the need for the CRS assistance, at least until very recently (see below).

b. The ADRA Program

Much of what has been said related to CRS can also be said for ADRA (and its predecessor, SAWS), the other NGO activities funded by Title II in the social sectors. Whereas the CRS program focused on nutrition, health and education in the MCH and child and school feeding programs primarily, ADRA has focused largely on food-for-work (FFW) and small community-based project activities such as school and well construction and village wood lot creation. The numbers of beneficiaries reached each year by the CRS programs tended to fall within the 150-275,000 range. ADRA's non-relief program was smaller, often totaling less than 65,000 recipients per year. While CRS had a few very small FFW activities, ADRA had a very small MCH effort in some years. Thus, the two programs were distinctly different in their fundamental approaches. However, there is one major similarity, until recently, ADRA, like CRS was engaged in alleviating the adverse consequences of poverty, food and nutrition insecurity rather than confronting the causes. Both organizations have focused their efforts on the poorer regions in the northern half of the country.

c. Evaluative comment on the MCH, feeding and FFW Title II programs

In a real sense, both CRS and ADRA have been engaged over the years primary in "social safety net" activities. Such efforts by their very nature are, at best, holding actions--temporarily helping the beneficiaries they have the resources to reach. Without an overall improvement in the livelihoods of the poorer quintiles of the Ghanaian population there has been little hope that either ADRA or CRS could ever extract themselves from continuing the same MCH, feeding and FFW activities year-after-year. The USAID/Ghana 1982 CDSS stated the problem very clearly:

"The Title II program cannot solve, although it can ameliorate, deficiencies in current nutritional standards. Other Mission approaches toward resolving the pervasive malnutrition problem in Ghana...rely on programs aimed at improving agricultural production, reducing population growth and putting in place a more responsive primary health care delivery system and improving incomes and equity."

Thus far, improvement in these sub-sectors has been too limited to have impacted significantly on the livelihoods, food security, nutrition, health or access to social services of the vast majority of the Ghanaian poor, notwithstanding efforts by all the donors--including USAID--and the Government of Ghana.

d. Recent Developments of Significance for the Title II NGO Programs in the Social Sectors.

Commencing in the second half of the 1980s and gaining momentum with the changes in U.S. food aid legislation contained in the 1990 Farm Bill, the NGOs have been given increasing latitude to import and sell a potion of their Title II food resources. The local currency generated from these sales was initially intended to be used to cover a portion of the transportation and other in-country costs of the program. But increasingly, especially after 1991, the percentage of food that could be monetized was increased and the uses of that local currency resource expanded to include small-scale development activities. This has proved an important development in Ghana.

For example, the ADRA FFW-assisted school construction projects during the 1980s and early 1990s had consistently been troubled by the inability of the local communities to provide enough cash to purchase construction materials. ADRA had food to pay for labor, but materials costs were always standing in the way of completion of the schools. With the significant liberalization of NGO monetization policy stemming from the changes in the 1990 PL 480 Title II legislation, ADRA's contribution changed from food to local currency which could be used for the local purchase of materials and the communities were able to contribute the labor and the construction skills. Suddenly between one year and the next, the completion rates shot up to 100 percent and even some of the prior year schools which had remained unfinished could be completed. In Northern Region, for example ADRA completed 21 schools in 1993, the first year of monetization, 40 in 1994 plus finishing off 110 schools that had been started in prior years but were not finished for want of local currency financing for materials and completed another 55 in 1995. 1996 is being devoted to evaluating the experience with the school construction program to date.

An enlarged ability to monetize has also enabled CRS to venture into new development activities at the local level. It has engaged in a program of community-level food banks using local currency, intended to increase the capacity of local farmers and farmers associations to store food for their own use for weeks or months after harvest, or to be able to delay the sale of food stocks until prices go up. This has proved a successful endeavor and a particularly good use of food aid for the purpose of improving household food security.

In addition, both ADRA and CRS have learned the need to establish baseline status of food aid-supported projects and to monitor and evaluate performance over time and the impact of the projects on beneficiaries. CRS, because its principal target audience is food in the less food secure north, has moved its headquarters to Tamale, the administrative capital of Northern Region, where the core staff can be closer to their target group which is increasingly in the North. CRS has greatly curtailed its activities

in the better-off areas of Ghana in order to focus its scarce resources on those most in need.

One of the most important results of the PL 480 Title II program in Ghana has been the continued evolution of the NGOs into organizations with improved focus and capabilities to achieve measurable results. CRS, for example, undertook an effort as part of its primary school feeding program, to increase the attendance of girls in primary school. By providing a small monthly take-home ration for those girls achieving at least an 85 percent attendance record, CRS was able to increase female primary attendance by 15 percent in schools with the take-home ration over those without. Another significant lesson learned by CRS/Ghana in the village health worker component of its MCH/PHC activities was that: "Throughout CRS's implementation of health activities, one major lesson learned is that reliance on absolute volunteerism of key players in activity implementation adversely affects results especially when demand on these services is high." CRS is now fully focused on the community level, on the need to succeed in fully involving the community, and on the need to collect data before and after the intervention and again a third time a few years after cessation of outside interventions. These and other lessons form the underpinnings of the new CRS DAP.

The ADRA projects which the Evaluation Team had the opportunity to visit in the Northern Region likewise demonstrated evidence of having learned important lessons from ADRA's long experience with Title II resources. In all cases the strength of determination of the local community was ascertained through 'Needs Assessments' carried out by ADRA field staffs before committing resources to individual projects. Once approved, support to each project was continuously monitored and ex post evaluations have also been undertaken. In all the projects visited there was continuing benefit being derived, in some cases long after cessation of the ADRA assistance. In one community, for example, the ADRA assistance (construction of a school and assistance in developing a community wood lot) had been completed three years before but the school was enabling more than 300 students to attend classes where Ghanaian teachers had been posted. The woodlot had matured to the point where some of the fast-growing trees were being sold for construction purposes at a very good profit which was divided between a community fund for further capital improvements and the individual community households as income. In another ADRA project, a highly motivated woman had developed a number of interlocking businesses (tree nursery, fish farm, bakery, goat husbandry and composting facility) with the specific purpose of getting other women started in these businesses--and had already achieved a considerable number of successes.

Enough such Title II projects were observed for a major hypothesis to be formulated: Title II counterpart resources are now having visible, significant and sustainable development impact in limited areas in Ghana where the NGOs are operating and

where they have been able to benefit from a long history of experience, including past successes and failures and where they were now focused on engaging the energies and latent capacities of the participating communities themselves. Further, these successes have been achieved largely since the 1990 PL 480 legislative change which enabled a greater monetization of the Title II food resources. The ability to determine on a case-by-case basis whether local currency, food or some combination was the most appropriate contribution seems to have made a vast difference in the capacity of the NGOS to generate sustainable successes.

Another finding is that the Title II-assisted programs are all small-scale. While this manageable scale may be a major reason of their success, it still leaves the most important challenge of all unaddressed: how can a sufficient number of these small-scale program be implemented over, say, the next decade to have a major--and enduring--impact on the lives and livelihoods of a substantial number of the poor of Ghana? Is the present small-scale effort worth continuing if there is little if any chance of widespread replication over the intermediate term?

3. (Post-1991) Title III

The 1992-94 Title III program (together with the one-year 1991/92 $6 million Food for Development Title III program) provided $28 million of U.S. food commodities which have been monetized. The proceeds have been used in a number of ways to support the food security objective of the legislation. USAID/Ghana has proposed that the best way to approach the problem of food and nutrition insecurity using this resource is to spur the development of non-traditional exports as a way of enhancing income opportunities of poor Ghanaians in both rural and urban areas as well as increasing foreign exchange earnings from increased Ghanaian exports.

The Title III program was dependant upon the Ghanaian Government's actual undertaking of a series of policy reforms under the aegis of the Agricultural Productivity Promotion Program (APPP) within the broader context of the ERP. The impact of the Title III program on the overall policy and macroeconomic environment are dealt with elsewhere in this evaluation. Here the impact of the local currency counterpart used for development activities is discussed.

The 1992-94 Title III program had three major component: I) rehabilitating rural feeder roads in areas populated by smallholders where there were good prospects to further develop non-traditional exports, ii) assisting NGOs to promote increased production, value-added, transport and marketing of these exports, and iii) developing an independent, private Ghanaian policy research institute capable of undertaking quality policy research analysis. Because of delayed arrival of the food commodities, the whole

program fell behind by approximately one year and the actual implementation period was 1993-95 (with final disbursements in some line items continuing into 1996).

a. Feeder roads

Approximately 1,000km of feeder roads were identified for rehabilitation and development of on-going maintenance programs. These were located in all areas of the country and were selected on the basis of the potential for expansion of export crops and the number of rural households likely to benefit from the refurbishment of badly dilapidated roads and bridges (in some cases the existing roads had become virtually impassable, with whole villages cut off from significant commercial activities).

Assessing the impact of the road component on the social sectors is, of course, extremely difficult, especially such a short time after the roads have been rehabilitated. One can assume that, even under the best conditions, it would take several years for the increased economic activity envisaged to actually occur. Therefore, all the evaluation could do was to inspect some of the roads, question local leaders in their vicinity and surmise that the original selection of the roads was done in accordance with the original intent.

There is little doubt of the likely impact over time of improving the feeder road network in much or Ghana. As is well known, transport costs are high throughout the country. Poor, often impassable, roads impede the orderly and efficient marketing of products grown in rural areas and lowers the prices received by farmers in remoter areas. Likewise they prevent the timely availability of affordable agricultural inputs. So long as: I) the original selection of the roads was appropriate done, ii) the actual rehabilitation carried out with appropriate engineering and quality of work and iii) (perhaps most importantly) a workable schedule of maintenance developed and continued for each rehabilitated road segment, the evaluation team would conclude that undertaking the road rehabilitation component was appropriately high priority and that the impact of the roads on rural household income, improved and lower cost availability of agricultural inputs and social services will be enhanced and eventually achieved and the potential for increasing production, sale and export of the NTEs will be enhanced.

The Team visited seven rural feeder roads, two in the north and five in the south. As the rehabilitation had been undertaken within the past two or three years all road surfaces were in good condition. Interviews were held with local community leaders along the roads and with ordinary villagers to determine participant reactions to the road improvements. Virtually all reported increased vehicular traffic, although the numbers of trucks and buses were still quite low--a few per day. One group of women reported that it was now possible for them to carry their farm production to large markets some

distance away which had been impossible previously. A truck driver had been willing to pick them up and deliver them back for a set fee. Another community leader several kilometers outside Tamale commented that it was now possible to convey people to health clinics and hospitals where it had been impossible to do so earlier. Stacks of wood, charcoal and fruits and vegetables were placed all along the roads waiting for sale. One Team was told that one of the roads visited had reconnected several villages to the economy which had been cut off for many years because of the impassability of the earlier road. In sum, the roadworks seem to have accomplished exactly what they were supposed to have accomplished; enabling trade of goods and services where such had been difficult to impossible previously. The test of the enduring impact is, of course, in the quality and reliability of continuing maintenance. At present all roads visited were in good condition, owing more to their recent rehabilitation than to maintenance regimes that would guarantee their long lived utility. It was impossible to assess the quality or, more importantly, the sustainability of local maintenance. It will be an several years before that is known.

b. NGO Projects.

Local currency generated under Title III has been made available to six NGOs: TechnoServe (TNS), Aid to Artisans Ghana (ATAG), Rural Focus (RF) and to three small cooperative marketing organizations (Ghana Assorted Foodstuffs Exporters Association, Organization for Export Development of Seafoods and Federation of Associations of Ghanaian Exporters). By far the majority of the resources and of the activities have been associated with TNS and, to a lesser extent, ATAG. Only very minor allocations had been made to the other NGOS and, thus, this Evaluation focuses on TNS and ATAG.

1.) TechnoServe

TNS has received support from Title II, Title III ($835,000) and also from USAID/Ghana's Trade and Investment Program, TIP ($664,000). The counterpart from the sale by TNS of Title II wheat has been deposited into the Community Enterprise Development and Investment (CEDI) Trust Fund, a locally-registered charitable trust fund established by TNS.

The TNS program is almost entirely focused on assisting Ghanaian associations of entrepreneurs to increase agricultural production, and value added to foodstuffs and non-traditional exports. Technical and financial assistance has been provided to: I) the Intermediate Technology Small-Scale Palm Oil Mills (ITSPM) project, ii) the Farmer Service Cooperatives (FSC) program and iii) the Non-Traditional Export Development Program.

Improving household food security is the primary stated objective of TNS activities in Ghana. An internal mid-term evaluation conducted in October, 1994 concluded that:

"TechnoServe Ghana's program of rural, community-based, agricultural enterprise development has contributed significantly to enhancing food security of local beneficiaries--men and women alike--at the household level, and has also made a positive economic impact at the community, regional, and national levels."

This conclusion was based on comparing the household food security of rural households in Upper West Region who were participating in a TNS inventory credit program with nearby farm households who were not. They determined the same was true in rural communities served by TNS elsewhere in Northern Central and the southern Regions. "The impact," the TNS evaluation stated, "on food security of TechnoServe's assistance comes mainly through increased household incomes, and the resultant ability of farmers and their families to purchase food supplies during the lean season." While the relationship between increased household income and improved access to food at the individual level is not as robust as this conclusion might suggest, nonetheless there is significant positive correlation in most cases to agree that improved household income is a step in the right direction toward greater household food security.

TNS has been operating in Ghana since 1971. During the period it has been receiving assistance under the PL 480 Program it has provided assistance to 18 associations or cooperatives. The membership of these associations ranges between 50 and 250. Thus the total number of participating households is probably about 2,000 and the total number of individuals benefitted is roughly in the neighborhood of 12,000.

The Team visited TNS activities in Central, Cape Coast and Northern Regions, looking at the palm oil and farmer service cooperative programs. The methodology is based on community involvement in every step of the process, careful monitoring and periodic evaluation of cost effectiveness and impact. The attempt to link outputs with changes in food security status at the household level are all extremely impressive. The potential for these organizations to be strong enough to continue on their own once TNS support ends seems extremely high. The community motivation, enthusiasm and results achieved thus far all speak of sustainable impact of great magnitude on the participating households. In a continent where failed rural cooperative-oriented donor assistance programs litter the landscape, there is much about the TNS approach to conclude that the use of PL 480 resources in such programs has a much higher than normal likelihood of initial success and sustainable growth.

The downside, if there is one, is that TNS is a small organization. It can only stretch to include a limited number of beneficiaries and the beneficial ripple of the program seems

relatively unlikely to extend--at least by example alone--to groups not initially assisted directly by TNS. The major question for consideration is not whether TNS projects are doing well what they have set out to do. They have, and will undoubtedly continue to do so. The question really is: so what? With a country of 16 million mostly poor people, how long would it take the TechnoServe experience to extended to a significant number of these equally poor individuals? If the vast majority of Ghanaians are likely to be as poor in 2050 as they were in 1996, is providing excellent help to a nearly insignificant minority worth doing? Is it anything more than tokenism, or the development of Potemkin Projects to have handy for visiting Senior USAID officials or Congressional Delegations? Will this use of food aid have really made a difference to a Ghana, writ large?

These questions are not intended in any way as a damnation of TechnoServe or of the USAID strategy in Ghana. As a matter of fact, given the resources they have to work with and the constraints within which these resources have been applied, the programs are excellent. The analogy is that of assisting the inhabitants of one stateroom while the oceanliner is sinking around them. The problem is that the resources are so limited and the problem so vast that one cannot make the connection, or understand the logic that links undertaking the smaller effort--however well done--to making a dent on the larger problem. Improving the food security of 12,000 people is a great idea, but does that lead to reducing the food insecurity of 10 million Ghanaians? One would hope so, but the linkages are neither explained nor obvious.

2.) ATAG

The ATAG project has provided assistance to a Ghanaian association of artisans and craftspeople to assist them to establish export markets for a wide variety of Ghanaian crafts. It has been supported with local currency from Title III. The project has succeeded in developing markets in the U.S., expanding the product lines of these artisans, expanding sales of the product and creating employment for several hundred people--men and women both. An estimated cedis 345 million have been made available from the two Title III projects and $660,000 from the TIP project for this endeavor.

As has been the case with the TNS activity, this project has had a successful start. The rate of growth of employment and of sales of artifacts created has been excellent, but from a very small base. It is difficult to see how there could be sufficient employment created to benefit a significant number of Ghanaian unemployed. While it may be possible to continue to expand the market for Ghanaian handicrafts 10-fold or 100-fold, it is difficult to see this program as a significant employment creator in Ghana.

c. The Center for Policy Analysis (CEPA)

The third component supported with local currency generated from the monetization of Title III commodities is the Center for Policy Action, intended to become a major source of policy research and analysis in Ghana. As CEPA has just barely begun to function, was still recruiting its research staff and has not yet produced its first reports, the Evaluation Team found it too early to attempt to determine any visible impact.

II. Food Aid and Equity in Ghana

A. Background

U.S. food aid legislation requires USAID food assistance to focus on improving food security in poor, food insecure countries. To accomplish that task in Ghana it is essential that the factors causing food and nutrition insecurity be identified, that those suffering the consequences of these factors be targeted for assistance and that the most effective modalities for using food aid resources be determined orchestrated and initiated--often in combination with non-food resources.

This section of the Working Paper looks at the contribution of food aid in Ghana to the objective of improving the allocation of quality-of-life improvements among different population groups, and particularly at whether food aid resources have been used in ways which will promote a more equitable distribution of benefits among the poor as opposed to the less poor, among women as well as men, rural as well as urban. There are actually two basic questions dealt with in this section: I) have PL 480 resources been directed at objectives which are in line with a goal of a more equitable distribution of opportunity and of assets? ii) have these resources had a measurable impact on the factors creating differing resource availabilities among various groups of the Ghanaian population? In other words, were the food resources programmed and utilized in ways that assisted those with less than average production or income to be in a position to produce and earn more? Has food aid been employed in ways that have enabled the poor to gain greater access to social services than would have been the case in the absence of food aid?

B. Poverty in Ghana and its Distribution

As has been noted elsewhere in this Evaluation, food and nutrition insecurity in Ghana is widespread. It is rooted in pervasive poverty, low labor productivity, transportation and marketing inefficiencies, poor access to health services and low rates of education--particularly among women--to name just some of the more obvious

indicators. The three rounds of the GLSS, the DHS data on malnutrition and poor health, recent reports by the World Bank, UNICEF and WFP and data collected by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, the Ghana Statistical Service, and large numbers of individual studies combine to paint a picture of widespread poverty--both urban and rural--extremely low and stagnated per capita production of goods, increasing prices for basic food commodities and widespread unemployment and underemployment.

While the ERP has apparently been effective in turning around the deteriorated macroeconomic situation existing in the country in the early 1980s, a considerable portion of the 5 percent growth rate achieved during the 1983-1992 period was, according to the Ghanaian Economic Research Institute, to be found in the services sector rather than in increased production of goods. As is well documented, the largest single sub-sector of the Ghanaian economy, agriculture, has grown at only about 2.5 percent over the period (WFP, UNICEF data) while the population growth rate is estimated to have been between 2.8 and 3.1 percent over those years. Ghanaian food production was thus decreasing rather than increasing on a per capita basis during the same period that the macroeconomic indicators were seemingly so robust. As noted earlier in this study, the gap between domestic food availability and domestic demand seems likely to grow enormously over the next 20 or more years unless there is a major change in domestic agricultural production, an unlikely scenario in a country where so little public or private investment has been dedicated to domestic agriculture, particularly to the growing of food for domestic consumption.

While it is clear that most Ghanaians are very poor, it is somewhat less clear who among the population are the poorer groups, where they are located and what have been the recent trends among the various factors which combine to create that poverty. Looking at indicators of food production and availability, nutrition and health, inhabitants of the three northern regions are clearly the worst off.

What is known is that the people of the three northern regions are worse off, according to many economic and social indicators than are those in the southern regions. The poor in the southern half of the country are in many cases better off than the relatively well-off in the north, according to the World Bank's "Poverty Past, Present and Future" report. In addition, poverty studies have confirmed that women, who are responsible for so much of the country's agricultural output and value added in agriculture, are at a distinct disadvantage to men in income earned. "Women therefore bear a disproportionate share of the burden of being poor..." according to the World Bank study.

With regard to the equitable allocation of Government spending on social services, it has been found that the bottom quarter of the population received about 16 percent of the value of spending on education and only 12 percent of spending on health. Urban

Ghanaians had 50 percent more spent on their education than did rural Ghanaians. For every cedi spent on health for a person in rural Ghana, approximately 3 cedis were spent on health services for the urban dweller. (Note: all these data are from the "Extended Poverty Study" which was financed by the World Bank.) These are only a few of the signs of the wide disparities between the very poor in Ghana and those who are at least by comparison, considerably better off, in terms of assets, access and opportunity. The former group are primarily northern, rural and women more often than men. The latter are primarily southern, urban dwellers and men more often than women.

C. Title I

To the extent that Title I was used primarily as a sign of support for appropriate policy in the pre-1983 era and was provided as a form of general budget support, it is impossible to measure its impact on efforts to improve equity. The reasons are the same as were stated in Section III above.

In the post-1983 period, the years corresponding with the ERP program, Title I and to certain extent Title III were provided to support Government moves to liberalize the economy, remove subsidies, eliminate Government direct participation in the manufacture and marketing of goods and in setting price regimes. Here, although the ERP has in many ways been an extremely successful and necessary phase of Ghana's (still unfolding) economic reform, it was known from the beginning that the program would create added hardship, at least temporarily, for some segments of Ghana's population.

For the period 1988-92 (unfortunately there have were no data gathering efforts in the 1983-4 period which might have provided a better gauge of change) surveys by the Ghana Statistical Service indicate a reduction in the relative numbers of Ghanaians living in poverty from 36.9 percent in 1988 to 31.4 percent in 1992. These numbers present a relatively incomplete picture, however, as there is considerable evidence that in the post 1992 period there has been a substantial deterioration in living standards (World Bank, 1995, Economic Research Institute comments to the Team). The GSS survey also noted a substantial increase in the percentage of the residents of Accra found to be living in poverty from 8.5 percent in 1988 to 23.0 percent in 1992. This data, too, is highly suspicious and because of survey design or implementation problems leading to results that may not reflect the true proportion of the residents of the capital city living in poverty in either the beginning or end years.

Thus, one might tentatively conclude that some evidence suggests at least temporary improvement in living standards for many of the poor during at least a four-year

period, but that for urban dwellers, on the contrary, there is fragmentary evidence to suggest a worsening situation. Further there is much evidence (substantial food price increases and reduced real purchasing power among the poor, unemployment increases, a possible slow-down in the rate of growth in agricultural production) suggesting a retreat in the numbers of the poor benefitting in some degree from the ERP reforms in the post-1992 era. (Discussions with the Economic Research Institute confirmed their assessment that the overall economic situation is continuing to deteriorate, as of mid-1996.) As a result it becomes nearly impossible to tell whether the program food aid provided by the U.S. in support of structural adjustment efforts has indirectly supported improvement in reducing inequities between better-off and poor population groups, or not. The impact simply cannot be determined.

D. Title II and post-1991 Title III

As was discussed in Section II above, The NGOs who have traditionally utilizing Title II (and now Title III) resources, either food or local currency or both, have for quite a long time concentrated their efforts on the poorer population groups, predominately in the north. Most NGO programs have operated at the community level in the rural areas and have focused on improving access to health and education services, improving food production and food retention effectiveness of poor households engaged in agricultural production or adding value to agricultural production. Under Title II, the increased ability to monetize appears to have increased, considerably, the ability of the food aid resource to deliver measurable and apparently sustainable improvements in the livelihood-earning opportunities of their target beneficiaries. Title III support, particularly to TechnoServe and ATAG, have sought to increase the income opportunities of poor farmers and artisans engaged in the production of non-traditional exports--either agricultural or handicrafts.

In all these community-based programs there have been special efforts to ensure that women--as much, or more than, men--were the target beneficiaries. In the case of the CRS school feeding program, an old-style humanitarian approach is given new life by experimenting with ways to increase the attendance rates of female primary school students. In the case of the ADRA and TechnoServe projects, the Evaluation Team was able to verify by participatory interviews that women were participating every bit as much as men in farmers' associations and in the increased returns accruing to the participating member households. The craftspeople involved in the ATAG program were as likely to be women as men and their returns per worker were the same.

The Rural Feeder Roads program was, by definition, undertaken in rural areas and often served, as was noted earlier, in re-linking disconnected communities to the national economy. Many of those likely to be benefited will be the women traders who

move from their home villages to neighboring market centers to sell their household products. There is little doubt that these roads will bring added rewards to the rural poor--men and women alike. This, of course, will come to depend heavily on the success of that critical aspect of the rural roads program which the Evaluation Team was unable to authenticate--on-going road maintenance over the long term.

Another aspect of these NGO programs, and to a certain extent, the feeder road program, which seems to contribute to equity at least indirectly, is evidence of much greater community participation in decision making which has been fostered by the intermediary organizations using food aid for community-level development activities. Without exception, the Evaluation Team's visits to project sites brought evidence of full participation by the community in the development and implementation of food-aided project. Further, in at least one case, TechnoServe support to the farmer cooperative 30 kilometers from Techiman, it was clear that the project itself had focused on developing the leadership and active membership of what had been a totally moribund cooperative and had breathed life into the self-governance domain of this particular group of farming households. Given the free flow of ideas and plans for the future (a future which they knew would be one without continuing TechnoServe support) it seemed evident that TNS had kindled a self-perpetuating organization which had built considerable self-confidence. Discussion with the leaders of two other cooperatives which accompanied the Team to the site, indicated strongly that the enthusiasm extended to at least two more cooperatives. Based on the Team's sample of three, it would appear that TechnoServe is instilling a major element of local governance into these community-level associations which, if present evidence is any guide, seems highly likely to endure and to spill over into other efforts by these communities.

As was the case in Section II above, there is no problem with how Title II and Title III food and local currency resources were directed--full marks for that. The problem in considering the effectiveness and impact potential for food aid is that, as is the situation for all small-scale development projects which prove to be successful at a small level of effort, how can they lead to major impacts? What is the theory which demonstrates to the skeptic that they are anything more than localized, small, virtually unique activities? How are their successes multiplied until, within a reasonable time period, the effect could be experienced by a substantial number of Ghana's poor households? Where do the resources come from to do that? And, if that expansion is, in fact, not contemplated, is continuing these very small (admittedly beneficial to the thousands of beneficiaries who participate) projects worth continuing in the face of a massive unmet need for similar help on the part of millions of Ghanaians not included? This is not a question for the Evaluation Team to answer. But it demands consideration by others within the Agency.

III. Political Stability

Introduction

Ghanaians have lived under four constitutions since independence from British colonial rule in 1957. Three democratically - elected governments fell to military coups during this period. The present government was elected under the 1992 constitution. In December, 1996 Ghana holds its first elections under a democratically - elected government. Many of the Ghanaians interviewed for this evaluation expressed the hope that the 1996 election marks their nation's passage to sustained political stability.

An important issue in this evaluation concerns the extent to which the PL 480 program can be credited with contributing to this goal. Specifically, the issue is the extent to which food aid, when provided by a reliable source, contributes to political stability (Don McClelland, Food Aid Concept Paper, March 1996, P.5). The importance of the issue for sustainable development more than justifies its inclusion in the evaluation.

Ghanaian Political Stability

Ghanaian political stability may be defined as the popular acceptance of political rulers as possessing the legitimate authority to govern and the absence of extra-constitutional (often violent) behavior aimed at their overthrow. The 1992 and 1996 elections are examples of the former; the 1979 military coup exemplifies the latter. This definition goes beyond the mere seizing or retaining of power - the right to govern must be granted willingly by the people. The 1992 constitution makes this clear: all powers of Government spring from the will of the people (Boeteng, Ibid., p.210).

> Among the most important conditions for the political viability of a state are a stable government and internal cohesion. Given these two conditions , especially the latter, a state can qualify for description as a nation, that is, a group of people who, regardless of internal ethnic and linguistic diversity, feel such an overriding sense of unity and common destiny that they are prepared to live together and bear the label of a nation state. Ghana is such an entity."
> E. A. Boateng, Government and the People: Outlook for Democracy in Ghana, 1996, P. 28

Political stability is also cited as a basic precondition for sustainable development (McClelland, Ibid, p.5). It provides the favorable systemic environment - comprised of popular support, domestic tranquillity, and leadership continuity - in which development can take root and thrive. It also attracts foreign donors and investors that value stability as an essential indicator of development potential. Ghanaians we talked with are well aware of the importance of outsiders' perceptions of Ghana as a viable - and stable - investment site.

The people interviewed remarked that Ghana is enjoying a period of political stability. The 1992 elections are generally assessed as having been fair and the 1996 election campaign so far has been peaceful. Our field trip witnessed numerous campaign happenings that were lively and unobtrusive. People we talked with seem to take for it granted that the election will happen, that it will be fair, and that the results will be honored. As one person stated it: People are tired of fighting it's not the way to go. President Rawlings has publicly invited the international community to observe the election at every polling place to make sure that the election is fair, transparent and peaceful (Television address, Accra, Ghana, September 7, 1996).

Our sources also acknowledge that the country lacks a long track record in constitutional governance. Political stability has been a sometime thing. Therefore any attempt to explain political stability has to recognize the elusive and episodic nature of the concept in the Ghanaian context. A recent paper, for example, points out that, despite the fact that political competition and elections have existed in Ghana, no civilian government has existed for more that 27 months prior to the 1992 elections (Denise Rollins, Strategic Objective No. 5: Increasing Democratic Participation, Draft Document, September 1996). There simply has not been that much long term political stability to account for over the last 35 years.

Food Aid and Political Stability

The impact of food aid may be approached from three distinct analytical optics: direct impacts; indirect impacts; and enabling impacts. Direct impacts require unambiguous, unique and demonstrable links between food aid and political stability. For example, economic reforms can be traced credibly to the presence or absence of food aid. Indirect impacts, on the other hand, require specific mediating factors to forge the link. Food aid has an impact, for example, on electoral reform only when it is delivered as part of a broad array of services. Both direct and indirect impacts posit a measurable link between food aid and stability. Enabling impacts, conversely, do not require this link. They rest on the presumption that food aid helps create an environment that could affect stability. Food for work, for example, puts food on the worker's table that will help reduce family food scarcity and improve children's nutrition.

Direct Impacts

We began this evaluation on the alert for either compelling data or testimony that food aid played a direct, decisive role in securing political stability in Ghana. A big bang impact. None of the evaluations documented convincingly the direct impacts of food aid on Ghanaian politics. Mentions of a connection between food aid and political stability were very brief and offered more as a side bar to the main analysis and findings. Typical of this type of assertion is the following: Government of Ghana agreed to further implement measures to promote further liberalization of the wheat market (S. Vordzorgbe, Evaluation of the Ghana Food for Development Program PL

480, Title III July 1994). Unfortunately the evaluation does not provide compelling data or documentation to support the claim.

> "there is low general public awareness of the food aid program. People like the free food. They think the Government is giving it to them. But you can't really prove a linkage between food aid and political stability." Person interviewed for this evaluation.

None the conversations generated assertions that food aid could by itself account for episodes of political stability. To argue that food aid affects stability directly, one has to demonstrate that the populace holds the Government accountable (and blames it) for food shortages. So, if the Government provides food that ameliorates food scarcity, then the people should react positively with greater support. However, our interviews revealed that *Ghanaians generally do not blame the Government for food shortages.* The 1983 food crises, for example, is blamed on a severe drought and a nationwide epidemic of fires that decimated food stocks. As one person summed it up: "The Government can't do anything about the weather."

Indirect Impacts

The most compelling evidence for indirect impacts are the claims that food aid played a role in policy reform as an effective policy dialogue incentive. People interviewed in the mission as well as outside the mission contend that food aid was an effective aid tool that the USAID Mission Director could use to gain a seat at the policy reform table. Resourceful Directors were able to include food aid in a comprehensive resource package that could be used to bring parties to the table to discuss reforms. The privatization of the fertilizer supply is cited as an example (Evaluation of the Agricultural Productivity Promotion Program (APPP) and the Ghana Food for Development Program. Title III, September 1993).

Even those citing the policy dialogue incentive point concede that proving that food aid is an effective tool is very difficult. It is like trying to prove that one scrum in a rugby match was decisive. Nonetheless the people interviewed were in a position to know the dynamics of the process and the policy reform outcome was cited by enough respondents to give it credibility.

Enabling Impacts

> "Women get the chance to use their skills to earn some money that they can use for their family. They control the money and decide how it will be used. They learn that they can earn their own money. It's very encouraging for them." Mary Salifu-Boforo, Techiman, Ghana. Women's Cooperative funded in part by Title II, and assisted by ADRA.

From our interviews and site visits we encountered numerous examples of food aid impacting various enabling conditions. The schemata summarizes the range of impacts in terms of three main conditions: employment generation, food access and community development. The figure denotes the Title I - III programs comprising the overall food aid package. The food for work program is an obvious employment generation program. Site visit interviews suggested that the many of the participants gained work skills that they were able to use after their participation to secure new work. The MCH clinics are providing access to scarce health resources. The clinic we visited in Tamale is providing food rations, nutrition counseling, and health check-ups for women and their babies. The food rations are an effective incentive to get the women into the clinic for much needed check-ups and counseling.

The Title III feeder road rehabilitation projects potentially will have an enabling impact, according to those interviewed. They cite the increased access to markets for their crops as one immediate benefit of the feeder roads. They also mentioned the increased truck traffic - picking up farm produce and wood - as another benefit. Over time, they also see the roads as increasing their access to health services. Title III funds have helped reinvigorate a farmers cooperative in Techiman that is using profits to build storage facilities and purchase machinery (grain thresher). The cooperative is comprised of men and women in the village, all of whom participate in the cooperative decision making regarding the use of profits (Grain Storage Cooperative, Techiman, Ghana, Title III, assisted by TechnoServe).

All of these examples of enabling impacts have political stability implications. They represent actual and potential improvements in the individual and community condition that could reinforce the perception that someone is doing something to help. Many of the people interviewed say they think the Government of Ghana is involved in providing the food aid goods and assistance. To the degree that they appreciate the help, the Government gets at least some of the credit. The food aid program staff (e.g., Catholic Relief Services, ADRA, TechnoServe) seemed to feel this way, too, stating that the people they worked with give the government some of the credit for the assistance they receive. And since they view this assistance as meeting their needs, it seems

reasonable to assume that they will be more supportive of the Government which in turn contributes to stability.

It should be stressed, however, that this support presumes that the Government is democratically elected and acts in a constitutionally-appropriate manner. As stated above, the Ghanaian people we talked with emphasized that Ghana should stay on the road to sustained political reform as evidenced by fair elections and constitutional governance. As a taxi driver commented: "The 1992 election was peaceful and the people accepted the result because they thought it (i.e., the election) was fair."

Some Lessons Learned About Political Factors

The assessment of the impact of food aid on political stability has resulted in several lessons learned. They are noted here in part to suggest an agenda for the future implementation of the program.

1. There is a low level of popular awareness of the food aid program and its development purpose. People know about the food and appreciate receiving it - but they are often unclear about its source and the contributors of the other program components, such as the feeder roads. If a program objective is to increase awareness of the program, then a more effective public awareness effort is called for.

2. Ghanians reportedly do not hold the Government of Ghana responsible for food scarcity. They tend to point to other factors (e.g., weather) as most important. Also, they lack organizing leadership. Thus, food scarcity is not likely to spark significant anti-government actions that threaten stability, and that could be ameliorated by food aid.

3. Food aid programs (e.g., direct food, food for work, MCH, feeder roads) appear to benefit those who directly participate in them. However, sustained, systemic development impacts are problematic. More effort should go into expanding the population exposed to demonstrably effective food aid components.

4. Food aid appears to most notably promote an enabling environment (e.g., infrastructure, MCH, employment generation) that could contribute to community development and employment generation while dealing with food scarcity.

5. Political stability has had a short life in Ghana. It should be handled very carefully while it matures.

Model

PL 480 Policy Impact Hypothesis: Ghana



Figure ( )

PL 480 and Political Stability in Ghana: Impacts Model



IV. Evaluation Methodology

Evaluating the role of food aid in sustainable development presents several methodological problems. The main problem stems from its comprehensive nature--covering virtually all non-emergency food aid provided by the United States to Ghana over a 30 year period.

Food aid is not homogenous. At a minimum, one needs to recognize the important distinction between project food aid, where food commodities are provided to specific groups of beneficiaries and program food aid which is not targeted; anyone with money can purchase it. Project food aid in Ghana, supports food for work, maternal and child health activities, and school feeding programs. Unlike program food aid, project food aid provides food directly to vulnerable groups in Ghana's poorest regions.

In Ghana, Title I food was sold on the open market and was clearly program food aid. Until about 5 years ago, all Title II food was provided to specific beneficiaries. Now, much of Title II is monetized; food is sold in the open market and the local currency proceeds are used by NGOs for specific development projects designed to improve food security of vulnerable groups. The same is true for PL-480 Title III; a portion has been used as program aid, and a portion has been monetized, much like Title II--food is sold and the proceeds used to support NGO and government development projects that focus on food security for the most vulnerable groups.

This evaluation is based on eight propositions, or hypotheses, concerning the role of food aid in sustainable development---five suggesting a positive role and three a negative role. On the positive side the propositions suggest that food aid: (1) improves economic growth by saving foreign exchange; (2) supports development by providing local currency for Ghana's development budget; (3) providing a positive social impact by improving children's nutrition, increasing school attendance, and supporting health programs; (4) helping maintain political stability; and (5) benefiting the poor. But food aid might also have a negative side: (6) creating a disincentive to domestic food production; (7) creating a dependency on food aid commodities; and (8) generally being inferior to dollar assistance. These eight propositions or hypotheses, guided the Ghana food aid evaluation.

Before leaving the U.S. to undertake field work, the evaluation team collected and analyzed longitudinal data covering the 30 year period when Ghana receive U.S. food aid--1965 to 1995. This provided a quantitative overview of the extent to which Ghana had achieved its economic and social objectives. It also established a backdrop against which to assess the role food aid might have played in the development process. In addition, the team reviewed program and project documentation, including past evaluations, which described the intended role of food aid. Finally, the team conducted

a series of U.S. interviews with present and former USAID and PVO managers to gain their perspective on the Ghana food aid program.

The evaluation team was in Ghana for three weeks during August/September 1996. Approximately seven days were spent in the field collecting data, interviewing beneficiaries and field managers, and assessing the physical outputs and impacts of food aid projects. The remaining time was spent in the capital, Accra, interviewing government officials, non-governmental organization, and other donors to gain both a current and historical perspective of the impact of food aid on Ghana's development.

Key informant interviews were organized around three topical guides. The same guides were used in each of the five country food aid evaluations. Each structured interview covered issues that had been identified in the food aid concept paper, thereby assuring consistency among the Ghana interviews and consistency with the interviews being conducted in the other country studies.

The site visits and field interviews in the Central Region and Cape Coast included two feeder roads constructed with labor intensive methods (picks and shovels) and three feeder roads constructed with mechanized graders and scrapers. The feeder roads were funded from monetized PL-480 Title III. Similar feeder roads had been funded with PL-480 Title I counterpart, prior to 1990. Interviews included district and local road engineers, a private sector road contractor, and laborers who worked on the road. Focus group interviews were held in two villages with approximately 30 people. The villages had been physically isolated two years ago, but now had access to nearby markets and services thanks to the new feeder road. Interviews included village headmen, farmers, traders, and agricultural processors. Approximately one-third of those interviewed were women.

There were also site visits to two village-based, small-scale, palm oil extraction facilities (funded by monetized PL-480 Title III) in the Central Region. Interviews included the NGO Project Manager, the cooperative manager and co-op members, palm oil traders, palm oil farmers, workers at the crushing facility, and those providing food and services to the workers. Approximately 80 percent of those interviewed were women.

Field visits in Northern, Eastern, and Ashanti Regions included the CRS Country Director, the regional Ministry of Health Office, CRS school feeding sites and CRS Maternal and Child Health (MCH) clinics. The managers and staff of the schools and MCH clinics were interviewed and focus group discussions were held with project beneficiaries in each village.

ADRA projects examined included food for work, two school construction sites, village wells, reforestation and village woodlots, two feeder roads, and local entrepreneurial activities (tree nurseries, fish farming, goat husbandry, and breadmaking). For each activity the staff, beneficiaries and a sample of local villagers were interviewed about project costs, benefits, and developmental impact.

A sample of TechnoServe projects included three farmer cooperatives that were storing maize, processing cassava and encouraging non-traditional agricultural crops. Staff and beneficiaries were interviewed at each site.

There is one final methodological point. Though this evaluation covered food aid over a 30-year period, it proved difficult to find documents, data and people covering the early years. Data and memories were particularly weak for the period that was more than ten years ago. For those earlier periods the evaluation relied heavily on published USAID reports and evaluations.

Figure 1: Total PL480 Food Aid Current Dollars, Ghana, 1965-1994



Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants

Figure 2: Food Aid as a Percent of Total Cereal Supply, Ghana, 1971-1992



Source: OECD, DAC database

Figure 3: Percent of Title I/III Delivered as Industrial Commodities



Source: USDA, U.S. Government Concessional Exports
Items include Cotton (Raw, Yarn, Fabric), Tallow, Tobacco

Figure 4: Total PL480 as a Percent of Exports, Ghana, 1965-1989



Sources: IMF Yearbook & U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants

Figure 5: PL 480 as a Percent of Ghana's Top 8 Food Crops



Sources: USDA Cnsl Exps & Ghana Min Food & Agiculture, Production Data
Crops: Cassava, Plantain, Cocoyam, Yam, Sorghum, Millet, Maize, Rice

Figure 6: Per Capita Production of Top 8 Food Crops, Ghana



Source: Ghana Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Production Data
Crops: Cassava, Plantain, Cocoyam, Yam, Sorghum, Millet, Maize, Rice

Figure 7: PL480, Title I/III Ghana, 1965-1994



Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants
Figures in Constant 1990 Dollars

Figure 8: Total PL480 Ghana, 1965-1994



Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants
Figures in Constant 1990 Dollars

Figure 9: PL480 as a Percent of Total U.S. Economic Assistance to Ghana



Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants

Figure 10: U.S. Food Aid as a Percent of World Food Aid to Ghana



Source: OECD, DAC Database

Figure 11: GDP Per Capita Ghana, 1965-1993



Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook (IMF)
Figures in Constant 1990 Prices

Figure 12: Population Ghana, 1965-1993



Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook (IMF)

Figure 13: Population Increase Ghana, 1965-1994



Source: USDA & FAO's SOFA95 Data

Figure 14: Average Daily Calorie Availability, Ghana, 1965-1992



Source: USDA and FAO's SOFA95 Data

Data Series 1: Ghana, U.S. vs. World Food Aid; Food Aid as % of Cereal Supply

(Metric Tons)

Year	World Cer. Food Aid	U.S. Cereal Food Aid	Domestic Supply	US Aid % of Dom. Suply	Rest % of Dom. Suply
1971	87200	44900	911000	4.93	4.64
1972	69960	9500	921000	1.03	6.56
1973	36200	7000	875000	0.80	3.34
1974	32800	10100	959000	1.05	2.37
1975	32000	8800	945000	0.93	2.46
1976	54500	25500	800000	3.19	3.63
1977	84350	16000	854000	1.87	8.00
1978	73281	49800	854000	5.83	2.75
1979	110000	70300	864000	8.14	4.59
1980	94313	86489	981000	8.82	0.80
1981	43130	31190	859000	3.63	1.39
1982	58435	29640	804000	3.69	3.58
1983	74900	16898	800000	2.11	7.25
1984	95878	51727	774000	6.68	5.70
1985	96406	50497	1165000	4.33	3.94
1986	66035	29815	1056000	2.82	3.43
1987	109622	74283	1166000	6.37	3.03
1988	46306	17340	1371000	1.26	2.11
1989	73374	40135	1409000	2.85	2.36
1990	72003	27149	1388000	1.96	3.23
1991	190759	109700	1483000	7.40	5.47
1992	75350	44034	1706000	2.58	1.84
1993	126498	74446			

Note: Total Supply = Production + Imports - Exports + Change in Stocks
Source: OECD, DAC Public Database, 1996 data tape and FAO PC Database
File: Report2.wk4

Series 2: Food Aid as % of Exports; Percent Industrial Commodities

Year	Ttl pl480 Current $	Ttl pl480 In 1990 $	Ttl Exports In 1990 $	PL480 as % Ghana Exp	Title I (MT) 0	Indus. Com. 0	% Inds. C. 0
1965	0.8	3.5	658	0.5	0	0	0
1966	6.7	28.4	554	5.1	35574	0	0
1967	8.5	35	710	4.9	47855	5162	11
1968	14.2	55.3	983	5.6	43047	19756	46
1969	19.1	69.7	966	7.2	15576	15327	98
1970	12.0	41.2	677	6.1	43448	18573	43
1971	1.7	5.5	719	0.8	59328	17484	29
1972	10.7	32.7	819	4.0	44442	3265	7
1973	0.9	2.6	1058	0.2	9171	3483	38
1974	2.1	5.4	812	0.7	0	0	0
1975	2.8	6.5	897	0.7	0	0	0
1976	6.1	13.3	689	1.9	0	0	0
1977	6.6	13.4	483	2.8	0	0	0
1978	3.1	5.8	353	1.6	0	0	0
1979	14.6	25.1	467	5.4	58936	0	0
1980	15.7	24.6	386	6.4	63063	0	0
1981	19.0	27	188	14.4	48594	0	0
1982	13.3	17.7	120	14.8	0	0	0
1983	5.1	6.5	239	2.7	18373	1304	7
1984	18.8	23.1	318	7.3	0	0	0
1985	21.5	25.6	456	5.6	761	761	100
1986	18.7	21.6	747	2.9	20510	5230	25
1987	24.7	18.7	985	1.9	5085	1840	36
1988	10.4	20	1063	1.9	0	0	0
1989	18.4	19.2	1106	1.7	13199	0	0
1990	14.3	14.3			10300	0	0
1991	15.0	14.5			48700	0	0
1992	13.7	12.9			47000	0	0
1993	24.5	22.5			38000	0	0
1994	16.6	14.8			22400	0	0

VI. EFFICIENCY OF FOOD AID

Instead of food aid, why not provide cash? The Ghana case study provides some answers to that question.

The U.S. has provided both program and projectized food aid, along with development assistance programs that included dollar funded projects and cash transfers. While food aid feeding programs and dollar funded technical assistance are quite different, in many respects non-project (or program) food aid and non-project development assistance (cash transfers) are similar. Both transfer a real resource and they each generate local currency to support development projects.

Efficiency is examined from both the donor's perspective and from the perspective of the recipient country. The analysis uses some of the same issues that were identified in the Indonesia Food Aid Case Study.

1. Reliability. As noted in the Lessons-Learned section of this report, Title I food aid was provided at specific points in time when the Government of Ghana appeared ready to launch economic reforms. However, bursts of reform tended to be short-lived, and Title I was short-lived (see figure X). It was not a reliable and continuing development resource. On the commodity availability side, the Unites States postponed an agreement only once, in 198?? (when world wheat prices were high and U.S. stocks were low). *From Ghana's perspective, Title I food aid was not a long-term, reliable resource flow.*

2. Flexibility in generating local currency and selecting imports. Both PL-480 Title I/III and cash transfers were used in Ghana to generate local currency and to fund imports. The 1993 USAID Title III evaluation (PAD Consultants, Ghana, Sept. 1993) compared local currency generation and use under food aid to local currency generation and use under USAID's Agricultural Productivity Promotion Program (APPP), which was a policy reform, cash transfer program.

Under APPP, dollars were auctioned to Ghanaian importers and local currency was generated immediately. It then was applied to development programs. In contrast, the evaluation noted numerous delays and increased costs from using food aid sales to generate local currency. Food had to be purchased in the U.S. shipped to Ghana, unloaded, sold, local currency collected (which often took 90-120 days), and then processed through the government budget and finally actually spent on development activities. There were numerous delays which meant that a year or more usually elapsed before local currency was spent.

A final factor is that the APPP allowed commercial importers to select commodities that met commercial demand rather than having to import only wheat. *PL-480 was a second-best resource for both product selection and ease of local currency generation.*

3. Additionality. Food aid comes from a U.S. budget category that is separate and additive to regular USAID development assistance. U.S. food aid is not legislatively fungible with non-food assistance. As a result, the availability of food aid as a separate source of U.S. assistance enabled the United States to provide Ghana with substantial *additional assistance that would not have been available otherwise.*

4. Commodity mix. In the 1960s, 70s and 80s PL-480 Title I was viewed by many in the U.S. Government as a way to dispose of U.S. agricultural surpluses. It was in large part supply-driven and commodities were determined by whether they were in surplus in the U.S. For Ghana, that was rarely a problem since the two cereals Ghana needed (wheat and rice) were almost always available. The case was different with vegetable oil.

In 1988/89 the U.S. wanted to move stocks of vegetable oil and told Ghana it would be provided under the next Title I agreement. Ghana meets most of its needs from domestic palm oil production and the rest from imports (that were cheaper than U.S. vegetable oil). The Ghana Government, not wanting to offend the U.S., just before a Paris aid donors consultative group meeting, agreed to accept the vegetable oil. After having difficulty moving the higher priced U.S. product, and taking the heat from domestic oil producers, the Ghana Government asked the U.S. not to provide any more vegetable oil. It also did the same with Canadian aid that was providing vegetable oil. *Except for Title I vegetable oil, Ghana received appropriate commodities.*

5. Logistics. USAID found itself drawn into a thicket of logistical issues. Food had to be shipped from the U.S., unloaded at Ghanaian ports, cleared from the ports and then shipped up-country (over an inadequate rail and road system). Local currency generations then had to be tracked to final expenditure. Physical and financial accounting was required at each stage. If the U.S. could have provided cash it could have avoided those problems. However, except for the APPP cash transfer, USAID never had that option--it did not have access to large amounts of untied cash assistance. Also, Ghana has been in food deficit for the last 30 years; it needed food imports and lacked the foreign exchange to import food commercially.

There was however, one clear benefit from the logistical problems. USAID used its policy leverage to get the government out of the business of importing and distributing food. Now, a more efficient system of private importers, millers, and distributors handle both food aid and commercial food imports.

VII. PERSONS INTERVIEWED FOR THIS EVALUATION

United States:

Daryle McIntyre	Ghana Desk Officer, USAID/BHR/FFP
Mary June	Ghana Desk Officer, USAID/AFR
William Haven North	Former USAID/Ghana Mission Director, 1971-75
Brad Rutherford	Program Officer, Winrock International
Judy Bryson	Former USAID/FFP/Ghana, Curently Africare
William Lynch	West Africa Desk, Catholic Relief Services
Henry Panlibuton	Africa Operations, TechnoServe
Robert Brock	Ghana Desk, Adventist Development Relief Agency

USAID/Ghana and U.S. Embassy

Myron Golden	Mission Director
William Jeffers	Deputy Mission Director
William Akiwumi	TAP Office
Peter Weisel	TAP Office
Emmanuel Atieku	Dvp. Program Specialist
Jeff Lee	TAP Office
James Freund	Economic and Commercial Officer, U.S. Embassy
Teetee Weisel	Commercial Specialist, U.S. Embassy
Yaw Asante-Kwabiah	Agricultural Specialist, USDA/FAS, U.S. Embassy

Accra, Ghana

George Baiden	Director, Adventist Development and Relief Agency
Margaret Bowman-Hicks	Country Director, TechnoServe
Hannah Evans-Lutterodt	Dp. Res. Representative, Catholic Relief Services
Bridget Kyerematen	Executive Director, Aid to Artisans, Ghana, (ATAG)
A. Akoto Osel	Research Fellow, CEPA
Charles D. Jebuni	Research Fellow, CEPA
Rune Skinnebach	National Expert, EC Delegate
Nana Koranteng	Development Programme Officer, CIDA
Matthew Powell	Statistical Advisor, Min. Finance Stat. Div., ODA
Ken Williams	Country Representative, UNICEF
Eimar Barr	Deputy Representative, UNICEF
Victoria Quinn	Nutrition Consultant
Osamu Kosegawa	Deputy Resident Representative, JICA
Ramesh Gupta	Country Director, World Food Programme
Felix Gomez	Programme Officer, WFP
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Mary Salifu-Borofo	Entrepreneur, Tamale
John Heloo	Manager, TechnoServe
Residents	Villages of Kumbunga, Gisonayilli, Tootenyeli

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